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THE APPROPRIATE LIMITS OF SCIENCE IN
THE FORMATION OF PUBLIC POLICY
MAUREEN L. CONDIC AND SAMUEL B. CONDIC*
INTRODUCTION
Science and technology are increasingly the subject of legis-
lative and policy decisions. These topics are frequently attended
by considerable disagreement and public debate. Often, the
opinions and recommendations of scientific experts contrast viv-
idly with the opinions of many Americans, leaving policy makers
with no clear consensus on how to proceed. What are the appro-
priate limits of scientific testimony in the formation of public pol-
icy? How are decisions regarding scientific issues to be justly
made and what considerations must be taken into account when
evaluating the opinions and information provided by scientific
experts? The utility of scientific testimony depends critically on
the nature of the decision at hand and is limited both by the
culture of science and the personality traits of scientists.
I. MAKING PRUDENTIAL AND MORAL JUDGMENTS
Society has developed a collection of habits, customs, and
norms that assist us in making prudential and moral judgments
when confronted with new experiences and situations. Pruden-
tial judgments are concerned with practical assessments of risk
and benefit: What are the most fitting means to achieve a desira-
ble end. "Absolute power corrupts absolutely" is an example of a
prudential judgment that has led to the constitutional Separation
of Powers.' In contrast, moral judgments are concerned with the
nature of right and wrong; what should and should not be done
* Dr. Maureen L. Condic is an Assistant Professor of Neurobiology and
Anatomy at the University of Utah, currently investigating the regeneration of
embryonic and adult neurons following injury; Samuel B. Condic is currently
pursuing a Doctoral degree in Philosophy at the University of St. Thomas
Center for Thomistic Studies in Houston, Texas.
1. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison). "The accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of
one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal Constitution,
therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation of power, or with a mixture of powers,
having a dangerous tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be
necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system." Id. (emphasis added).
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in a fair and just society. "Thou shalt not kill" is an example of a
moral prohibition deeply ingrained in our culture that has led to
the legal prohibition of murder.
In both prudential and moral matters, we have certain cul-
tural "guideposts" that assist in evaluating new situations as they
arise. If someone proposes doing away with the legislative
branch of government, we instinctively know that this is an
imprudent course of action based on past experience. If we wit-
ness one man shoot another on the street, we can rather quickly
determine that one man has killed another and, furthermore, if
the shooting was not in self defense, that this killing is homicide.2
In both cases, we have clear cultural and personal experiences
that assist us in determining the proper course of action.
But judgment based on past experience has its limits. As
long as the new objects or experiences under consideration are
commonplace or readily derived from commonplace things, cul-
tural habits are more often than not reliable guides. Pilgrims
were able to grow corn, a completely new crop, because corn is
sufficiently similar to other cultivated plants and the pilgrims had
a long experience with cultivation. Little Johnny knows that if he
takes Billy's new toy he is stealing because the toy, novel though
it may be, clearly belongs to Billy. But as objects become further
and further removed from common experience, they also
become further and further removed from the common wisdom
that is culture. Because modern science is in the business of dis-
covering new things, it is constantly uncovering items that defy
our cultural coping mechanism.
II. THE SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER
Scientific technology can draw into the realm of the possible
that which had previously existed only in the world of the imagi-
nation. The doors that open at the leading edge of the scientific
frontier are in many ways unlike those that are opened by other
types of human expansion into unexplored domains. The newly
discovered American continent held unexpected terrain for
those pioneers intrepid enough to venture into the unknown,
but surviving such an expedition was largely a matter of good old-
fashioned common sense and ingenuity. Despite the romance
and danger of an unexplored continent, the challenges
presented by such a frontier are well within the historic experi-
2. See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 577 (1st ed. 1891) (defining homicide as
"[t]he killing of any human creature" and "justifiable homicide" as that which is
committed "under such circumstances of necessity or duty as render the act
proper, and relieve the party from the shadow of blame").
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ence of the human race. Similarly, the forefronts of other
human pursuits-art, literature, and music-are all character-
ized more by the novelty of their arrangements than by the uni-
queness of their content. Not so with the forefront of the
scientific endeavor.
The uniqueness of the scientific frontier is not due to the
arcane nature of science or the inherent complexity of scientific
information, but rather to the unnaturalness of the landscape
opened up by scientific findings. A scientific advance that
enables radically different human experiences (human cloning
as a form of reproduction, for example) is not merely a new
example of a familiar category, and our prior experience with
"classical" reproduction offers very little to guide our response.
Advances on the scientific frontier define a terrain we must navi-
gate largely without the benefit of a historic precedent. This
aspect of scientific frontier generates grave difficulties for
lawmakers when attempting to set public policy. Traditionally,
precedent plays a prominent role in our law as well as our own
decision-making: X is similar to Y, and hence the rule that gov-
erns Y should also govern X. But when the X in question is so
completely unlike anything that has come before it, when there
is no clearly discernable Y to compare it against, how should one
proceed?
Nowhere is the radically new nature of the scientific frontier
more evident than in the field of modern molecular biology and
medicine. Advances over the last decade have been profound,
and the pace of discovery mind-numbing. We have seen the
unraveling of the human genetic code, the ability to alter or
replace genetic information at will, to generate hybrid organisms
that express characteristics of two (or more) distinct species, to
identify dozens of human genes responsible for disease (a pro-
cess that once took decades, if possible at all), even the develop-
ment of technologies to exactly duplicate entire individuals by
cloning-all within the last decade. Much that once existed only
in the realm of the imagination is now securely within the
domain of the newly possible-a domain that is (in the opinion
of many) advancing rapidly towards the previously unthinkable.
The rapid pace of advancement raises very real moral and
prudential questions. Although modern biology has done noth-
ing to undermine the prohibition against murder, it has brought
to light the question of when (and where) we become "alive" and
when we become "dead." Since much of what science discovers
is so completely removed from previous experiences, how are
sound moral and prudential judgments to be made? Given that
prudence demands that dangerous technologies be controlled
2003]
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and decency demands that evil technologies be prohibited, we
are left with the question of exactly when a technology becomes
dangerous or evil.
This problem of good judgment is further compounded in
the field of biology because of the intimate nature of the subject
matter. Perhaps due to our inherent narcissism and self-interest,
research into what makes our bodies function or fail is far more
compelling and carries a much more immediate emotional
impact than research into physics or chemistry. Biological
research has probed topics as intimate to our human experience
as our emotions, mental illness, the myriad ways in which we die,
and the expanding number of ways in which we can be born.
The boundaries of life and death have more than once been
redefined by modern medical research, and no other field raises
issues as profound or as critical to our self-conception, our val-
ues, and our very lives.
III. How TO NAVIGATE THE SCIENTIFIC FRONTIER?
Any successful navigation of the uncharted waters of mod-
ern medical research will require us first to determine whether
the question is principally one of prudence or one of morals.
Both moral and prudential questions are serious and carry grave
consequences. In matters of science and technology, both moral
and prudential issues unquestionably require input from scien-
tists familiar with the "new realities." However, the character of
the debate differs depending on whether the question is a moral
or prudential one, and the authority of the scientist qua scientist
differs vastly as well.
A question of prudence is principally a question of risk:
What are the risks and what level of risk should society accept?
For example, in the 1970s, the advent of recombinant DNA tech-
nology and the attendant fears of "frankenfoods" being released
into the environment spurred a sustained public debate and the
formation of a Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee at the
National Institutes of Health. While a question of practical pol-
icy can always lead to a question of morals, in this example the
debate was principally one of the risks associated with such food
and how best to manage that risk.3 There was ultimately little
moral impact on the policy.
On the other end of the spectrum, there is the "debate" over
in vitro fertilization (IVF) technology, which has proceeded
smoothly to product marketing with nary a ripple of serious pub-
3. SHELDON KRIMSKY, GENETIC ALCHEMY: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE
RECOMBINANT DNA CONTROVERSY 113-25, 181-96 (1982).
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lic alarm. The pace of IVF research has been rapid-driven by
strong motivation of infertile couples to have a child-despite
the fact that there are serious moral questions about the technol-
ogy that have yet to be resolved. Recently, concern over surro-
gate mothers, egg donation, human cloning, and the prospect of
conducting scientific research on "left-over embryos," has indeed
caused the level of public alarm to rise.4 Many question the wis-
dom of the initial development of IVF technology in light of
where these procedures have led us. Surprisingly, these direc-
tions were readily apparent quite early on,5 and yet IVF technol-
ogy passed silendy under the radar of public alarm.
Surely the importance and emotional impact of advances in
molecular medicine warrant a thorough public and legislative
debate of new technologies. While such debates do not ensure a
tranquil public acceptance of any and all possible developments
pursuant to a new scientific finding, they are likely to maximize
the probability of this desirable outcome. Input from scientists
will necessarily form a critical component of this debate, and yet
the nature and extent of this input must be informed by a clear
understanding of the limitations of science as a discipline and of
scientists as practitioners of this discipline.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE LIMITS OF SCIENTIFIC TESTIMONY
What is the appropriate role of scientific testimony in the
debate over whether and how the frontier of science will be
expanded? This role will clearly differ, depending upon whether
the question is principally one of morality or one of prudence
and risk management. When it comes to morals, the key insight
to remember is that scientific research is about the possible, not
about the ethical or the good. As such, scientific evidence can
inform society whether something can, at this point in time, be
done and scientific judgment can predict whether it is probable
something will be done in the future, but science is inherenly
silent on the topic of whether it should be done. In other words,
a scientist, qua scientist is no better equipped to weigh-in on the
moral implications of some new technology by virtue of his scien-
tific training than is any other person. Indeed, scientists are, in
many respects, uniquely unsuited to make moral Judgments-pre-
cisely due to their focus on the possible. Much that is "possible,"
4. See Avery Dulles et al., The Gospel of Life: A Symposium, 56 FIRST THINGS
32-38 (1995); see also TERESA IGLESIAS, IVF AND JusTICE: MORAL, SOCIAL, AND
LEGAL ISSUES RELATED TO HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILISATION (1991).
5. See LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE 43-127 (1985).
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and a legitimate topic of investigation from the perspective of
science, is nonetheless objectively evil.
In matters both practical and moral, it is nearly impossible
to navigate the arcane world of the newly possible without some
input from scientists themselves. Rationally considering the
direction public policy will take to best serve the interests of a
free and democratic society requires an assessment of what is, in
fact, possible now, what will be (to the best of our knowledge)
likely in the future and what risks are associated with this possibil-
ity. Such an assessment can only be made by relying on the testi-
mony of scientific experts.
Evaluating scientific testimony and assigning it appropriate
weight in the public debate requires some consideration of at
least three factors that significantly limit the utility of such testi-
mony: 1) how the culture of science and the personality selected
by the profession act to bias the opinions of scientists on scien-
tific topics; 2) how the roles of scientists as practitioners and busi-
nessmen compromise "expert testimony"; 3) how scientists are
viewed by society and how popular myths and misperceptions
color purportedly "neutral" scientific testimony.
V. THE CULTURE OF SCIENCE
Much has been written (often in glowing terms by scientists
themselves) about the culture of science and the personality
traits of the idealized scientist.6 Far less openly acknowledged
have been the ways in which science selects personality traits and
behavioral strategies that limit the utility of scientific testimony in
a broader social context. In particular, scientists are prone to
significant blind spots when it comes to the broader interests of
society-a myopia that must be taken into consideration when
assigning weight to the testimony and opinions of scientific
experts.
A. Optimism Untainted by the Facts
Scientists are fundamentally optimists. The first step in the
pursuit of a scientific question is the formation of a hypothesis,
based both upon the existing evidence as well as on gut-level
intuition. Testing a hypothesis generally requires a considerable
6. See generally, e.g., EDWARD 0. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1998); RicHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER: WHY THE Evi-
DENCE OF EVOLUTION REVEALS A UNIVERSE WITHOUT DESIGN (1996); JACQUES
MONOD, CHANCE AND NECESSITY- AN ESSAY ON THE NATURAL PHILOSOPHY OF
MODERN BIOLOGY (Austryn Wainhouse trans., 1972).
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investment in effort and time7 -an investment that is sustained
by the optimistic hope for a positive outcome. Vindication of a
scientific hypothesis is a pleasure that is hard to describe to a
non-scientist: part elation over uncovering an answer; part relief
that, despite the daily irrationalities of life, the universe is indeed
intelligible; part triumph over odds that invariably favor a nega-
tive outcome; part just plain pride. Scientific optimism is not
simply a matter of trust in the explanatory power of science, it is
hope for an answer and faith in the underlying intelligibility of
nature as well.
As optimists, scientists are prone to exaggerate the "prom-
ise" of scientific approaches. Rarely do scientists hold
unfounded opinions (at least on scientific matters) but until
proven by evidence, even the most well-founded scientific hypoth-
esis remains merely an educated guess. Faith in the ultimate vin-
dication of a particular hypothesis is not a scientific judgment; it
is a matter of personal opinion. The tendency to conflate opin-
ion (or hope) with the scientific evidence upon which that hope-
ful opinion is based is certainly understandable, yet it is
nonetheless misleading. This conflation requires that assertions
of scientists about facts not yet proven be taken with a considera-
ble grain of salt.
Exacerbating the general tendency in science towards opti-
mism is the fact that scientists, compared to the general public,
have a very different understanding of what terms like "promise"
or "breakthrough" mean. Non-scientists will generally impute
considerably greater confidence to the assertions of scientists
than do scientists themselves. While non-scientists read the
"promise" of a promising scientific approach as exactly that-a
guarantee, in good faith, that an approach will yield an expected
outcome-scientists see "promise" as no more than a prediction
of likely outcome. Promising areas of research are merely interest-
ing ones, worthy of pursuit and likely to yield the expected find-
ing. Should the "unlikely" prove to be the case, most scientists
would find this result quite interesting and would in no way see
such a turn of events as a breach of "promise." Reversals of
7. A recent search of the Computerized Retrieval of Information on Sci-
entific Projects (CRISP) database at the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
(http://commons.cit.nih.gov/crisp3/Crisp-Query.Generate-Screen) for the
2002 funding year revealed 198 grants to individual investigators that have been
continuously funded for between 30 and 35 years, with five projects that have
been continuously funded for more than 45 years. See NAT'L INSTS. OF HEALTH,
CURRENT AND HIsToRIcAL AwARDs (1972-2003) QUERY FoRM, at http://com-
mons.cit.nih.gov/crisp3/Crisp-Query.Generate-Screen (last visited Jan. 24,
2003) (on file with author).
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expectation happen so frequently in scientific research, one must
simply take them in stride and not look back. Assertions of
"promise" from scientists are best taken with the same gravity as
assertions of unending love from a confirmed philanderer; while
commitment to a specific hypothesis may be made in genuine
sincerity at the time, with the full support of the existing evi-
dence, such commitments last only until a more attractive data
set comes along. While such "flexibility" might be unattractive in
personal behavior and imprudent as a basis for public policy, it is
essential in the practice of science.
Similarly, scientists will often characterize exciting results as
"breakthroughs," asserting that the findings now "prove" a partic-
ular feat can in fact be accomplished. While most people believe
"breakthroughs" have important implications for the treatment
of disease or injury, this is usually far from the case. For scien-
tists, a breakthrough merely refers to findings that significantly
advance our understanding of a phenomenon. A breakthrough
may represent a very interesting intellectual answer to a nagging
or intractable puzzle-but it doesn't necessarily translate into a
practical or medical application. As stated above, science is
about defining the possible. A breakthrough may bring into the
realm of the possible that which was previously excluded, but
possible is not the same thing as feasible or practical.
For example, under experimental conditions, manipulating
gene 'X' may result in complete remission of an otherwise lethal
disease. Scientists would readily characterize such a finding as a
"breakthrough" that "proves" a cure is possible. Nonetheless,
due to the fact that such manipulations can be done in experi-
mental animals only at very early embryonic stages, it is not now
the case, nor is it ever likely to be the case that genes in patients
will be manipulated in the same manner to cure human disease.
Thus, while a cure is now within the realm of the possible (under
highly restricted experimental conditions), it is by no means
within the realm of the practical. Assertions of "proof' and
"breakthrough" need to be judiciously classified, either as proofs
of principle (that something can be done under laboratory condi-
tions) or proofs of practice (that something can be done under
real-life conditions).
B. Forever Further Research vs. "Done Enough"
Vannevar Bush, head of the Office of Scientific Research
and Development in the middle of the last century, authored a
proposal for the creation of a government-funded national scien-
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tific agency, entitled "Science, The Endless Frontier."' While the
title was surely intended to convey the essential optimism and
limitlessness of science, the ironic truth is that "endless" suggests
"interminable" as equally as it does "limitless." In the face of
unproductive, or merely "promising" results, optimistic scientists
frequently invoke the endless frontier of science under the gen-
eral panacea of "further research is required." There is always
one more experiment to do or one more technique to try that
may turn a negative finding into a positive one. For a particularly
compelling hypothesis, this process of tinkering and hoping can
indeed stretch on interminably, even in the face of substantial
data opposing the hypothesis. Rarely is a hypothesis strictly dis-
proved by the data. An idea can be disproved in this particular
circumstance, under these specific conditions-but there is
always hope that these conditions may be the exception rather
than the rule. The endless frontier of science can easily become
one of perpetual hopeful exploration with no particular end
point in sight.
The most significant negative effect of the endless scientific
frontier is the reluctance of scientists to call it quits or to con-
sider the relative merit of scientific endeavors in the face of press-
ing competition for limited public resources. Almost
instinctively, scientists will advocate "further research" as the
answer to any and all objections raised to a particular line of
experimentation, particularly if the objection is that the research
has failed to yield the anticipated societal benefit. To a scientist,
interesting lines of experimentation are intrinsically valuable,
regardless of their applicability to real world situations. This
mindset significantly impairs the ability of scientists to make even
prudential judgments regarding scientific research. From a prac-
tical point of view, the pure pursuit of knowledge must be
weighed against the cost. While there are many cases in which
future research will resolve questions that are at this time
unresolved-there are equally many in which further research is
unlikely to alter the current state of affairs. Due to their essential
optimism and focus on what may be possible, scientists cannot be
counted on to reliably make such distinctions.
Just as the practical applications of scientific research are
limited by the endless pursuit of interesting research, they are
equally limited by the failure to bring to a practical completion
lines of research that are no longer interesting. Scientists readily
8. VANNEVAR BUSH, SCIENCE, THE ENDLESS FRONTIER: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT ON A PROGRAM FOR POSTWAR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (Nat'l Sci. Found.
40th Anniversary ed. 1990).
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abandon investigations as uninteresting once the essential ques-
tion has been resolved. Resolving the central question often
leaves many aspects of the problem that are critical for a practical
application entirely unaddressed. The need to address critical,
although perhaps less scientifically interesting, questions also
falls under the panacea of "further research is required." The
difference is merely that such "uninteresting" research is always
assumed to be the responsibility of someone else, and conse-
quently is rarely accomplished. Unfortunately, the pharmaceuti-
cal industry is generally reluctant to pick up on "promising"
scientific findings that are still full of practical holes and uncer-
tainties. Thus, while the "promise" of such abandoned lines of
research may be real, it is never actualized.
In evaluating the "promise" of a promising scientific
approach, it is important to consider evidence that contradicts or
restricts that promise, as well as the evidence supporting it. A
proof in principal may not constitute a proof in practice. The
holes in our understanding that preclude a practical application
of a promising finding may never be filled, despite a commit-
ment of funds to further research. In a world of limited
resources, judgment calls must be made. The reluctance of
scientists to make such judgments based on the evidence is not
an excuse for policy makers to do the same.
C. "Don't tell me what to do"
The risks and speculation involved in the formation and test-
ing of a scientific hypothesis requires a particular type of individ-
ual. Scientists are not mavericks (science is too dependent on
established facts to favor rebels who reject the conventional), but
rather individualists who are willing to take any idea and run with
it. The highly complex and specialized nature of scientific infor-
mation only serves to exaggerate and reinforce the individualistic
tendency. It is surprisingly easy to be "the world's leading
expert" in a particular field-simply because "the field" may con-
sist of only a handful of other scientists interested in the same
questions and capable of intelligently discussing them. Scientists
in disciplines as related as neurobiology (the study of how cells in
the nervous system function) and neuroscience (the study of the
how the nervous system itself functions) can find it difficult to
communicate with each other at times, due to the specialized
information and terminology required to be proficient in each of
these fields.
The specialized nature of scientific information and the
complexity of the terminology contribute to a profound sense of
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autonomy, and an unwillingness to accept input from those per-
ceived as "unqualified" to levy reasonable criticism. Even among
fellow scientists, those deemed worthy to evaluate and restrict an
individual's research program are few and far between. Scientists
frequently lament the inadequacy of peer review for grants and
manuscripts-with the most common complaint being the "igno-
rance" of the reviewers and their consequent "incompetence" to
evaluate the data. If scientists are reluctant to accept evaluation
and restriction from other scientists, how much more so are they
unwilling to be constrained by the judgments of non-scientists?
The optimism and individualism of scientists results in an
exaggerated, "knee-jerk" unwillingness to be told what to do.
The sentiment underlying many of the advocacy positions taken
by scientific societies appears to be: Leave us alone to do as we
see fit, you who cannot understand or evaluate what we are
about. The reluctance of scientists to accept oversight is only
heightened by what scientists frequently perceive as ignorance
and suspicion in the mind of the public.9 Regrettably, there is
some truth in the view that the public is scientifically illiterate.
Irrational or unfounded objections to scientific findings only
serve to confirm scientists in their opposition to oversight. None-
theless, the resistance of scientists to external regulation is itself
quite irrational. While concerns regarding scientific advances
range from the well founded to the absurd, from the mindset of
most scientists, all opposition is absurd.
At their cores, scientists are motivated by curiosity. While a
desire to understand simply for the sake of understanding is cer-
tainly an advantage in scientific endeavors, curiosity itself does
not guarantee the object of investigation is worthwhile or benefi-
cial to society. There are no necessary limits to scientific curios-
ity-not even the limits of decency. History provides ample
illustration of how the free pursuit of science must be restricted
under some circumstances. The infamous experiments of Mil-
gram' ° or the Tuskegee Syphilis study,1 to give only two exam-
ples, are the kind of science some may elect to pursue if left with
only "scientific curiosity" as a guide. Endorsing scientific
research simply because it is interesting and it might prove useful
is a dangerous path with no clear guideposts. Much "useful"
9. See NAT'L Sci. FOUND. PUBL'N CLEARINGHOUSE, SCIENCE AND ENGINEER-
ING INDICATORS 2000, at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seindoo/start.htm (June
5, 2002) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
10. See Stanley Milgram, Some Conditions of Obedience and Disobedience to
Authority, 6 INT'LJ. PSYCHIATRY 259-76 (1968).
11. R.H. Kampmeier, The Tuskegee Study of Untreated Syphilis, 65 S. MED. J.
1247-51 (1972).
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information can be derived from experiments that are objectively
evil. The ends, no matter how noble, cannot justify any and all
possible means. The challenge to society is: How will the line be
drawn, and by whom? By virtue of their disposition and their
focus on "the possible," scientists are not particularly well-suited
to make such prudential judgments.
D. Scientific Gnosticism
Discovery of something new is inarguably a thrilling experi-
ence. But this thrill, when combined with a fiercely independent
nature and a subject matter far removed from common experi-
ence can fuel a scientific demagoguery and gnosticism. "Gnosti-
cism" is the generic name given to a collection of religious sects
that waxed and waned from the 5th century B.C. to the time of
Constantine.' 2 The unifying theme of these cults was the belief
that their members possessed special, secret knowledge that sepa-
rated them from the uninitiated masses.'" Possession of this
knowledge allowed the believer to see things as they "really are"
and thereby gain salvation.' 4 An inevitable air of superiority sur-
rounded the Gnostics because the "knowledge" they possessed
afforded them an allegedly more perfect view of reality. 5
The scientist who discovers something truly new, after years
of hard work, is naturally susceptible to the temptation to make
more of the discovery than is warranted. A clique can easily form
around the discovery to include all those who are "in the know"
and exclude those who "don't understand how this changes eve-
rything." Just as with religious Gnostics, scientists come to
believe that the "special knowledge" scientific information pro-
vides elevates their opinions and judgments above those of any-
one else. Other forms of understanding come to be seen as
inherently limited, flawed, or "quaint."
It is important to remember that while science readily pro-
duces new and unique instances of things heretofore unknown,
it rarely (very rarely) uncovers something that undermines the
principles by which all instances should be judged. Mere creation
of a new virus or a new form of animal by the wizardry of molecu-
lar biology does not alter the rules governing prudent and moral
12. For the general treatment of Gnosticism as given here, see WILLIAM A.
REESE, DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGION: EASTERN & WESTERN
THOUGHT 260-61 (1996), and NEw ADVENT, CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, at http:/
/www.newadvent.org/cathen/06592a.htm (Dec. 2, 2002) (on file with the
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy).
13. REESE, supra note 12, at 260-61.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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treatment of viruses and animals. Correctly classifying new discov-
eries and scientific creations can present a real challenge that
critically requires the input of scientists, but once the nature of
the "new reality" is understood with confidence, standard princi-
ples of judgment and precedent apply to new and old realities
alike.
It is also important to remember that scientific understand-
ing does not render other forms of human understanding obso-
lete or irrelevant. The scientific understanding that the human
body contains cells, which in turn contain DNA does not "trump"
a parent's understanding of a particular human as their child or
an ethical understanding of that child as a member of the
human race. Having a scientific understanding of the human
body may be required to evaluate a proposed experimental medi-
cal treatment, for example, but it does not reduce a child to a
collection of chemicals and cells. In practice, any scientific
understanding a parent may have is likely to make only a very
minor contribution to the overall understanding of their child.
Importantly, scientific information does not relieve even the
most scientific parents of the obligation to make decisions regard-
ing their children in the most comprehensive and just manner
possible; as a scientist, as a parent and as a citizen-under the law
and under God. The same obligation holds on a larger scale for
those charged with making legislative and policy decisions for
society.
VI. SCIENTISTS AS PRACTITIONERS AND BUSINESSMEN
Just as physicians are individuals engaged in the practice of
medicine, scientists are individuals who practice science for a liv-
ing. While this may seem absurdly obvious, the myriad ways in
which the roles of scientists as practitioners and businessmen
limit the utility of expert scientific testimony appear to be largely
misunderstood (or perhaps simply ignored) by policymakers and
the public alike. Misperceptions of how the business of science
operates result in the public assigning both too little and too
much credibility to the opinions of individual scientists.
A. Money and the Ttruth
The most popular misperception of scientists as practition-
ers is that funding mechanisms put economic pressure on
researchers to conform their results to a foregone conclusion.
The belief is that when a scientist takes money from the NIH or
from private industry to test a specific idea, the ensuing research
is virtually guaranteed to prove that idea correct. The motivation
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for this manipulation of the truth is presumed to be money.
Scientists will follow the money and manufacture data that allows
them to stay in the money. A growing number of patient advo-
cacy groups lobby aggressively for increased funding targeted to
specific diseases, based precisely on this misperception.
The first and most significant problem with this hypothesis is
that in most cases, there is very little relationship between
research funding and the personal financial status of the scien-
tist. The vast majority of basic scientists is employed by universi-
ties or research institutes.16 As academic or research faculty, the
salaries scientists earn are not proportionate to the level of fund-
ing their research programs enjoy. There are no year-end
bonuses or hefty commissions in academic science. For scientific
faculty, salaries typically remain constant whether scientists have
ample research funding or no funding at all. While there cer-
tainly are situations in which personal profit must be a considera-
tion,17 in the majority of circumstances "greed" per se is not a
major factor in the pursuit of research monies.
This is not to say that scientists are unmotivated to maintain
and increase research funding. Scientific research is astound-
ingly expensive. A single experiment in modern molecular biol-
ogy can typically cost thousands of dollars in supplies alone.
Without external research funding, universities and research
institutes would be unable to support the cost of research. More-
over, the vast majority of research personnel in a laboratory
(technicians, doctoral students, postdoctoral trainees) is paid
directly from research grants, and are not employees of the uni-
versity or institute. Thus, while scientists are not motivated to
secure and expand funding by personal greed, they are highly
motivated by the simple fact that without funding, they will be
unable to do their research at all.
The consequences of losing research funding can be cata-
strophic. No one relishes the thought of having to fire long-term
colleagues, collaborators and students due to a lack of funding.
In addition, a temporary loss of research funding can readily
16. Statistics maintained by the National Science Foundation for 1999
(the most recent year available) indicate that of 110,700 persons holding a doc-
toral degree in Biological Sciences, 79,500 are employed by academic or
research institutions, compared to 19,700 employed by industry, 10,100 by gov-
ernmental agencies and 1,400 who are self employed. SCIENTISTS AND ENGI-
NEERS STATISTICAL DATA SYSTEM, CHARACTERISTICS OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
IN THE UNITED STATES, at http://srsstats.sbe.nsf.gov/preformatted-tables/1999/
DST1999.html (June 20, 2001) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law,
Ethics & Public Policy).
17. See infra Part VI.C.
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become a permanent condition. Without money for reagents
and personnel it is virtually impossible to generate data, and suc-
cessfully competing for research funding requires preliminary
data to support the feasibility of the proposed experiments. Fear
of being trapped in such a "Catch-22" is very real, and a strong
motivator for most scientists to seek secure research funding.
Fear of losing funding due to factors that are outside of one's
direct control is also quite real. In many cases, budgetary rather
than scientific reasons dictate research funding decisions.
Indeed, many divisions of the NIH routinely fund no more than
20% of all applications they receive, with several Institutes fund-
ing considerably less.'" Scientists charged with evaluating the
quality of grant applications routinely express concern over the
number of excellent proposals that fall into this lower, unfunded
80%."9 All of these concerns translate into a strong motivation to
"diversify" the sources of research funding in an attempt to keep
overall funding levels as stable as possible.
The major sources of research funding are federal and local
government (principally the NIH for biological and medical
research), charitable foundations, and private industry.2 ° To
competently weigh scientific testimony on topics that may affect
these sources of research support, the relationship between
scientists as practitioners and their research funding must be
realistically understood.
B. Government Funding
How does the motivation to maintain a stable source of
research funding affect the nature or quality of the scientific
findings resulting from that funding? Surprisingly, for research
18. Statistics maintained by the NIH indicate that "success rate" (i.e., the
percent of grants submitted by individual investigators that are funded) varies
greatly between the Institutes. In 2001, a historically good year for funding,
individual institutes ranged between a 15% and 40% success rate. NAT'L INSTS.
OF HEALTH, AwARD DATA, at http://grants.nih.gov/grants/award/award.htm
(Jan. 6, 2003) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public
Policy).
19. Statistic derived from the author's personal experience.
20. Statistics maintained by the National Science Foundation indicate
that in 2000, the most recent year for which data is available, funding for
research at Universities and Colleges totaled $30,062 million, of which $19,697
million (approximately 65%) came from government sources, $2,178 million
(-7%) from industry, $5,924 million (-20%) from foundations, and $2,261 mil-
lion (-8%) from all other sources. NAT'L Sci. FOUND., ACADEMIC RESEARCH AND
DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES: FIsCAL YEAR 2000, at http://www.nsf.gov/sbe/srs/
nsf02308/sectb.htm#rd2 (Feb. 2000) (on file with the Notre Dame Journal of
Law, Ethics & Public Policy) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES].
20031
172 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 17
funded by the federal government and private foundations there
is very little impact. A truly extraordinary feature of government
and foundation-sponsored research is that the likelihood of
renewed funding is more dependent on productivity and impact
than on the precise nature of the findings. As noted above,
reversals of expectation are common in science. It is just as fre-
quent for a hypothesis to be invalidated as it is for the hypothesis
to be proven true. Consequently, there is considerable pressure
to resolve the question one way or another (i.e., to advance the
field), but very little pressure to demonstrate the expected find-
ing. Well-designed experiments are informative regardless of
their outcome-and fierce competition for limited research dol-
lars generally ensures that funded experiments are well-designed.
Thus, while it may appear that the push for ever-more research
funding and the competition for research dollars would provide
an incentive to generate ever-more positive findings, in practice
this is rarely the case.
In contrast, the inherent insecurity of research funding and
the competition for research dollars can strongly influence the
opinions of scientists regarding the appropriate level of public
resources to be devoted to scientific research. Science journalist
Daniel Greenberg has amply documented that scientists protest
the "inadequacy" of the NIH budget, despite a consistent growth
in this budget over the last forty years.21 Scientists will advocate
increases in NIH funding, even when appropriated funds are not
targeted towards their own areas of research, simply out of a con-
viction that a rising tide floats all boats. When a scientist's own
research program stands to profit directly from a greater availa-
bility of funds, this tendency is understandably even stronger.
Importantly, scientists advocate greater funding not out of a rea-
soned consideration of what level of research funding is most
appropriate to the overall interests of society, but rather out of a
personal conviction that all "good research" is inherently valua-
ble and should be funded. Unlike business or engineering
where one can reasonably ask, "How much will it take to get the
job done?," in the endless frontier of science, the job is never
done and no amount of funding is ever enough. The scientific
mindset and the practical constraints of research funding restrict
the ability of scientists to make sound prudential judgments
regarding science funding. Consideration of what kinds of
research to fund and at what level must be made within the
21. DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE, MONEY, AND POLITICS: POLITICAL TRI-
UMPH AND ETHICAL EROSION 78-88, 183-204 (2001).
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broader view of society's priorities, impassioned testimony of
scientists not withstanding.
C. Private Industry Funding
For an increasing number of scientists, stable research fund-
ing is found through private industry. The percentage of
research funding from private industry has grown consistently
over the last twenty years and currently hovers around 7% of all
academic research funding in the United States.2 2 Accepting
money from private industry to test a specific hypothesis does
carry some pressure to produce a positive finding. If a pharma-
ceutical company awards a substantial sum of money to test
whether a new drug is effective, they are unlikely to find either
outcome of this experiment equally desirable. Nonetheless, the
risk of scientists manipulating their data to curry the favor of
industrial sponsors is quite slim. Even in the absence of any
high-minded commitment to the truth, the fear that the com-
pany will refuse to fund additional research in the face of an
undesirable outcome is generally balanced by the equally strong
fear that falsified or misleading data will ultimately be uncovered.
Thankfully, the culture of science does not select strongly for the
craven or the unscrupulous. The personal rewards are too few,
the chance of disgrace too high, and the career path too arduous
to favor those interested in easy money at the expense of the
facts.
In recent years, the relationship between biomedical
research and commercial ventures has become more complex.
In addition to industry grants and partnerships, an increasing
number of academic scientists are directly involved in the grow-
ing biotechnology industry. Scientists are frequently founders,
board members and major stockholders or both in start-up bio-
technology firms that are positioned to exploit research results
with real (or perceived) marketing potential. In many cases,
scientists hold primary patents on the products these companies
are developing. Many of the prominent scientists whose opin-
ions are actively solicited by the media and by governmental lead-
ers are far from "disinterested" in the outcome of science policy
decisions. While this has been true for some time in the field of
engineering, it is a relatively new phenomenon for biomedical
research. The potential for a direct conflict of interest in the
recommendations of scientists has become quite significant and
must not be ignored when considering the purportedly "unbi-
ased" expert testimony of scientists. Even mere public advocacy
22. DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES, supra note 20.
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of specific research policies must be considered in light of the
direct financial interest scientists may have in the outcome of the
debate.
VII. POPULAR MYrHS
The popular myths surrounding the scientific profession are
complex and contradictory. In many respects, society affords
scientists great esteem as demigods of technology. The public
and the press tend to see scientists more as saints and heroes
than as mere practitioners of science and developers of technol-
ogy. Somehow, scientists are "different" from the rest of us-
brilliant, focused, and above all else, committed to objectivity
and the pure pursuit of knowledge, untainted by self-interested
or worldly concerns. Scientists are subject to this same type of
mythical thinking, a tendency that only serves to reinforce and
exaggerate scientific Gnosticism.
Equally compelling in the collective consciousness is the
view that scientists are hopelessly naive and unsuited to partici-
pate in the "real-world" decisions of politics. The most common
image of a scientist offered by popular entertainment is that of a
bumbling (although well-intentioned) maladroit who unwittingly
releases a lethal virus on the populace, requiring a policeman or
other "real-world" hero to save the day.2" This negative myth of
the scientist occasionally takes more extreme and darker forms.
The power of science and the complexity of scientific informa-
tion can fuel fears of the "mad-scientist"; an evil genius who uses
the magic of science to advance his own inscrutable (or unscru-
pulous) plans.24
As in all myths or stereotypes, there is a certain grain of
truth in these perceptions. Obviously, scientists are in possession
of a certain measure of intelligence, although the level of "bril-
liance" required to be successful in the profession is perhaps not
as high as one would imagine. As a class, scientists are relatively
uninterested in material things (a trait many would define as
"geekishness"). When compared to physicians or attorneys,
scientists are woefully under-compensated for their level of edu-
cation, providing some direct evidence for a lack of worldliness.
23. For example, in the movie "Outbreak" (1995), an important break-
through by scientists goes awry and the release of a virus that could kill millions
is prevented by the "real world hero" First Sergeant Dutton Hattfield.
24. One study indicates that negative television portrayals of scientists (as
killers, for example) are considerably more common than negative depictions
of other professionals. George Gerbner, Science on Television: How it Affects Public
Conceptions, 3 ISSUES ScI. AND TECH. 109-15 (1987).
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With rare exceptions, scientists are passionately committed to
objectivity and the truth, characteristics without which one gen-
erally doesn't proceed too far in a field where the "truth" is read-
ily verifiable by anyone with a mind to test it and the resources to
do so. As individualists, scientists are prone to defining their
research on their own terms, a trait that can lead to substantial
disregard for the social impact of scientific discoveries. This dis-
regard for public opinion or societal impact ("don't tell me what
to do") lends credibility to both of the negative scientific stereo-
types (i.e., the "bumbling" and the "mad" scientist), although
sociopathology is surely no more prevalent among scientists than
it is among other professionals. Clearly, none of these character-
istics are restricted to the scientific profession, but they are typi-
cal of scientists in general.
Nonetheless, the popular perception of scientists as either
heroes/gods or fools/egotists is largely unfounded. Daniel
Greenberg goes to great length to debunk many of the hallowed
myths surrounding scientists and how they function.25 Scientists,
as it turns out, are human beings-subject to the same kind of
failings and confusions that plague other members of the spe-
cies. The self-evident conclusion that scientists are merely
human apparently came as quite a surprise to Mr. Greenberg.
The fact that this topic warranted a treatise of 530 pages (replete
with appendices, tables, and statistics to bolster the obvious) pro-
vides evidence for the powerful influence of myths and stereo-
types in our cultural thinking about scientists and their
profession.
Popular myths that are resistant to the obvious are by no
means limited to the scientific profession. Many would assert
with sincerity that doctors are "noble," firemen are "heroes," and
grade-school teachers "saints." The surprising thing about the
myths surrounding scientists is the robustness of these myths and
their abilities to preclude common-sense judgments. Most peo-
ple, when faced with an individual physician, fireman, or teacher,
will evaluate them as individuals-with appropriate skepticism
and caution with regard to their motives and intentions. Not so
with scientists. While we may not want our child to marry one
(they are, after all, geeks), we trust them implicitly on matters of
science and science policy. The equation appears to be: How can
mere laymen hope to fathom the arcane depths of knowledge
scientists possess or doubt their commitment to objectivity and
the truth?
25. GREENBERG, supra note 21.
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The robust myths surrounding science lead society to give
the personal opinions and policy recommendations of scientists
far greater weight than they merit. A science policy position
signed by prominent Nobel Laureates has much greater social
impact than a business policy position signed by a similar num-
ber of Fortune-500 CEOs. Regardless of how successful a busi-
nessman has been and how admired he may be for his business
acumen, his motives are perceived to be too tainted by profit to
be altruistic. In the modern age, we take the assertion, "what's
good for General Motors is good for America," with considerable
skepticism. Yet we readily accept the parallel construction from
scientists ("What's good for research is good for America"),
based in large part upon the myth of scientists as heroes and
gods.
To define an appropriate limit to the mandate of scientists
and their influence on public policy, society must recognize the
power of this myth and actively work against it. In part, this
requires making an effort to be reasonably literate in scientific
matters. Having some knowledge of science goes a long way
towards demystifying the field and provides a personal basis for
rationally evaluating scientific evidence. Yet even with considera-
ble effort, mastery over all of modern molecular biology would
not be possible. Scientific information is simply too complex and
the body of scientific knowledge too large to circumvent the
requirement for expert testimony from scientists.
In light of the inherent dependence policy makers have on
scientists to summarize scientific information, it is important to
draw a distinction between what a scientist needs to know about a
particular topic and what is required for the formation of sound
policy. Evaluating whether a highway should be built in Tusca-
loosa does not require a detailed understanding of how to pour
concrete in the hot and humid weather found in those parts
(regardless of how a civil engineer may see the matter). Such an
evaluation does require an understanding of where the road will
lead and what purposes it will serve. Evaluating public policy on
genetic engineering, embryonic stem cells, or human cloning
similarly does not require a detailed understanding of the under-
lying technology-but rather a willingness to weigh the issues
raised by this technology in a broader social context without
merely deferring to the judgment of scientists or relying unduly
on vague assertions of "promise."
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CONCLUSIONS
Navigating uncharted waters at the frontier of scientific
research is inherently a difficult task fraught with danger. Scien-
tific discoveries define as newly possible things that were previ-
ously only imaginary and raise significant moral and prudential
issues for society. On moral issues, scientists are no more pre-
pared to provide an intelligent answer than anyone else. In
moral debates, the professional competence of the scientist is
limited to a presentation of the facts that delimit the boundaries
of the discussion. Yet even in cases of prudential judgment, the
testimony of scientists ought not be trusted implicitly. Scientists
as a group are optimistic in outlook, conservative in judgment,
and fiercely independent in nature. Add to this the fact that
many scientists have financial entanglements that can create con-
flicts of interest, and one must conclude that the "objective opin-
ion" of the scientist must be examined very carefully. Factors
that limit the credibility of scientific witnesses and restrict the
utility of their testimony include:
* Scientific optimism can result in exaggerated claims
regarding the practical applications of research.
" Terms like "promise," "breakthrough," and "proof' don't
mean the same thing for scientists as they do for the gen-
eral public; distinctions must be made between proof in
principle and proof in practice.
" Further research and expanded research funding do not
guarantee scientific "promise" will be brought to practical
fruition.
" Scientists resist any form of regulation or oversight, no
matter how warranted restrictions may be by social, eco-
nomic, or ethical considerations.
" Scientific curiosity is unconstrained by either prudence or
decency.
" Scientific understanding doesn't invalidate general princi-
ples or "trump" other forms of understanding.
" While scientists are typically not motivated by greed per se,
they rarely see research funding levels as adequate.
" Many scientists have financial involvements in biotechnol-
ogy that create significant conflict of interest.
* Robust myths notwithstanding, scientists are not saints or
heroes, and their personal opinions should not be consid-
ered more rational, objective, or disinterested than those
of anyone else.
In light of these considerations, what is to be done? How
can the testimony of scientists be fairly and neutrally interpreted
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without requiring an extraordinary level of scientific literacy on
the part of the public? In light of the foregoing discussion, a few
practical recommendations are offered.
A. Acknowledging Conflict of Interest
Scientific experts must be subject to the same disclosure
requirements regarding conflicts of interests that are applied to
everyone else. Scientists are unlikely to provide completely unbi-
ased testimony on topics that directly or indirectly affect the
funding levels available for their own research or for biotechnol-
ogy enterprises. The extent to which the research funding of the
scientist's own laboratory may be altered by the outcome of the
debate for which testimony is being solicited must be taken into
account. This potential conflict can be at least partially circum-
vented by soliciting testimony from scientists outside of the
immediate field who are able to provide expert scientific evalua-
tion without immediate concern for the security of their own
research funding. Moreover, testimony from scientists with
direct financial interest in the outcome of legislation, including
biotechnology patents and stock holdings in companies develop-
ing new technology (or both) should not be considered impar-
tial. Such individuals should be obliged to recuse themselves due
to the conflict of interest.
B. Restricting Scientific Testimony to Scientific Facts
Distinctions must be drawn between scientific findings and
mere opinion. Expert testimony from scientists should be
restricted to topics upon which they are, in fact, experts-the
current state of our understanding and the facts upon which it is
based. While scientists can be reasonably asked to summarize or
explain the scientific evidence, their opinions on issues outside
their areas of expertise (including moral or ethical issues) are no
more credible than those of any other person. It is curious how
many Nobelists in economics, physics, and chemistry (not to
mention film celebrities) feel compelled to weigh-in as "experts"
on matters of biological scienceZ6-and equally curious how
26. For example, recent statements by Nobel Laureates regarding stem
cell research and therapeutic cloning have received extensive media attention
and are frequently invoked in support of federal funding for stem cell and clon-
ing research. See, e.g., Morton M. Kondracke, Congress Should Allow and Control
'Research Cloning', ROLL CALL, Apr. 15, 2002; Rick Weiss, Nobel Laureates Back
Stem Cell Research; Group of 80 Recipients Sends Letter Asking Bush Not to Block Fund-
ingfor U.S. Studies, WASH. PosT, Feb. 22, 2001, at A02.
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much respect appears afforded such opinions.27 When present-
ing findings, scientists should be required to discuss both support-
ing and detracting evidence as well as provide a clear picture of
what is not yet known with certainty. The optimistic tendency of
scientists to focus on what is possible, but unproven, frequently
results in an incomplete and misleading picture. Advocating
public policy based on incomplete disclosure of the facts is not
science-it is propaganda.
C. Evaluating Assertions of "Promise"
The culture of science makes certain kinds of myopic judg-
ments highly probable. With great confidence one can predict
that regardless of the specific scientific topic under discussion the
testimony of most scientists will be: 1) the area of investigation
has promise, 2) further research and increased funding are
required, and 3) the progress of science must not be impeded by
legislative restrictions. While such recommendations say a great
deal about the culture of science and the personality traits
selected by the profession, they say very little about the actual
state of the scientific evidence.
Basing public policy or legislative decisions on unproven sci-
entific "promise" is naive and foolhardy. The "Missouri"
approach ("show me the data") is an entirely appropriate
response to optimistic scientific predictions of "promise." Scien-
tists are generally quite capable (when pressed) of outlining what
would constitute "proof of practice," and what would be required
to generate such a proof. Pressing them to do so, without set-
tling for the vague panacea of "further research" is both prudent
and reasonable.
27. Celebrities have been increasingly solicited for testimony before Con-
gress in recent years, a trend that has been noted more than once. See, e.g.,
Malia Rulom, Stars Come Out in Congress and One Senator Has Had Enough, Associ-
ATED PREss, June 6, 2002.
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